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I.

INTRODUCTION

The dissonance between international criminal law, as it is
currently developing, and the Islamic world is great. Likewise,
the gulf between the criminal law of Western societies and that
of Islamic societies is a wide one. Indeed, Westerners often only have tragic and brutal stories of stoning and honor killing on
which to base their perspectives of the Muslim world. Treatment of women often lies along the deepest recess of this
chasm. But that is slowly beginning to change in countries
where Shari‛a (traditional Islamic law) is not prevalent enough
to block it. The tragic yet hopeful story of Fawaz and Zahra
demonstrate how this can happen:
The struggle, if there was any, would have been very brief. Fawaz later recalled that his wife, Zahra, was sleeping soundly on
her side and curled slightly against the pillow when he rose at
dawn and readied himself for work at his construction job on the
outskirts of Damascus. It was a rainy Sunday morning in January and very cold; as he left, Fawaz turned back one last time to
tuck the blanket more snugly around his 16-year-old wife. Zahra
slept on without stirring, and her husband locked the door of
their tiny apartment carefully behind him.
Zahra was most likely still sleeping when her older brother,
Fayyez, entered the apartment a short time later, using a stolen
key and carrying a dagger. . . . [He] stabbed her five times in the
head and back: brutal, tearing thrusts that shattered the base of
her skull and nearly severed her spinal column. Leaving the door
open, Fayyez walked downstairs and out to the local police station. There, he reportedly turned himself in, telling the officers
on duty that he had killed his sister in order to remove the dishonor she had brought on the family by losing her virginity out of
wedlock nearly 10 months earlier.
“Fayyez told the police, ‘It is my right to correct this error . . . .
It’s true that my sister is married now, but we never washed
away the shame.’” By now, almost anyone in Syria who follows
the news can supply certain basic details about Zahra al-Azzo’s
life and death: how the girl, then only 15, was kidnapped in the
spring of 2006 near her home in northern Syria, taken to Damascus by her abductor and raped; how the police who discovered her
feared that her family, as commonly happens in Syria, would
blame Zahra for the rape and kill her; how these authorities then
placed Zahra in a prison for girls, believing it the only way to protect her from her relatives. And then in December, how a cousin
of Zahra’s, 27-year-old Fawaz, agreed to marry her in order to secure her release and also, he hoped, restore her reputation in the
eyes of her family; how, just a month after her wedding to Fawaz,
Zahra’s 25-year-old brother, Fayyez, stabbed her as she slept. . . .
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Under Syrian law, an honor killing is not murder, and the man
who commits it is not a murderer. As in many other Arab countries, even if the killer is convicted on the lesser charge of a
“crime of honor,” he is usually set free within months. Mentioning the killing — or even the name of the victim — generally becomes taboo.
That this has not happened with Zahra’s story — that her case...
has become something of a cause célèbre, a rallying point for lawyers, Islamic scholars and Syrian officials hoping to change the
laws that protect the perpetrators of honor crimes — is a result of
a peculiar confluence of circumstances. . . . But at heart it is because of Zahra’s young widower, Fawaz, who had spoken to his
bride only once before they became engaged. Now, defying his
tribe and their traditions, he has brought a civil lawsuit against
Zahra’s killer and is refusing to let her case be forgotten. 1

Honor killings have a long tradition in some parts of the
Muslim world, although they are neither mandated nor sanctioned by Islam. In highly conservative Islamic societies, the
small change in thinking that is beginning as a tentative bloom
in the sands of Syria remains unthinkable. From that rigid
perspective, the post-modern, highly secularized thinking in
Western society is simply beyond the pale. That is why Imams
have been known to issue fatwas against Pokémon – a child’s
2
cartoon character in the Japanese anime style.
It is a truism that there are multiple levels of incongruency
3
between Islamic societies and Western societies.
Some of
these differences are obvious, like those concerning treatment
of women, recognition of civil liberties, degree of societal religious adherence/tolerance, and the seriousness with which pluralistic liberal representative democratic institutions are supported. Others are less so. Many differences are based on
values, tradition, and the continued existence of a vibrant tribal life, especially in Arab and African societies, that pre-date
4
Islam but that continue to exist overlaid by Islam. Do these
incongruencies rise to the level of incompatibility?
Women’s rights advocate, Ayaan Hirsi Ali, a former Muslim, Somali woman and Dutch parliamentarian, reinforces this
message of incompatibility everywhere she goes: “The 21st
Katherine Zoepf, A Dishonorable Affair, N.Y. TIMES (Magazine), Sept.
23, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/23/magazine/23wwlnsyria-t.html.
2 Pokemon Faced with Fatwa, BBC NEWS, Apr. 9, 2001, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/entertainment/1269050.stm.
3 Jennifer F. Cohen, Islamic Law in Iran: Can It Protect the International
Legal Right of Freedom of Religion and Belief?, 9 CHI. J. INT’L L. 247 (2008).
4 Graham E. Fuller, A World Without Islam, 164 FOREIGN POL’Y 46, 47
(2008). “Without Islam, the face of the Middle East still remains complex and
conflicted. Struggles over power, territory, influence, and trade existed long
before Islam arrived.” Id.
1
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century began with a battle of ideas, and this battle is about
the values of the West versus those of Islam . . . Islam and liberal democracy are incompatible . . . Islam unreformed, as a set
of beliefs, is hostile to everything Western.” 5
In the wake of 9/11, many were moved to give renewed
credence to Harvard political scientist Samuel Huntington’s
dire prediction of civilizational warfare 6 in the context of pitting Islamic society against Western society. Figure 1 graphically depicts this diametric opposition of Islam to the West:
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---....,fI'--r!----- Islamic
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Orthodox

Japanese

Figure 1: Illustration derived from
SAMUEL HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS
(1996), Christopher Parham.

Huntington first floated his thesis to the general public in
a 1993 Foreign Affairs article, in which he asserted:
The great divisions among humankind and the dominating
Ayaan Hirsi Ali, The Role of Journalism Today, National Press Club
Washington, D.C. (June 19, 2007), available at http://www.islamwatch.org/AyanHirsi/Role-of-Journalism-Today.htm. [NA - please note we
found a different website for this proposition] Others disagree on the compatibility question. See SHIREEN T. HUNTER, THE FUTURE OF ISLAM AND THE
WEST: CLASH OF CIVILIAZATIONS OR PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE? (1998).
6 SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING
OF WORLD ORDER (1998).
5
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source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the
most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts
of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global
politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle
lines of the future. 7

While Huntington demurred on the question of whether a
clash of civilizations was actually occurring after 9/11, he left
that possibility open. 8
Corollary to this supposition of societal incompatibility,
which is no doubt true in some degree, is the general observation that most international criminal law structures are based
upon Western models. Thus, the argument that such legal
norms and institutions are also largely incongruent with Islamic societies should come as no surprise. The trial of Saddam
Hussein by Muslim judges attempting to use a Western-style
judicial institution is a case-in-point.
The Iraqi High Tribunal (“IHT”) was conceived and constructed by Western attorneys working for the Coalition Provisional Authority (“CPA”). The statute of the IHT grafted important Western concepts like due process, defense protections,
and evidentiary standards, which would be found in most international criminal tribunals, onto a domestic criminal court
within the post-war Iraqi legal system.
That Saddam’s trial was a chaotic affair, beset by difficulties from the beginning, evinced the failure of this graft to take.
Muslim Iraqi judges operating within an Islamic society attempted valiantly to operate the Western machinery, but to little avail. The Saddam trial and its aftermath have been round7 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations?, 72 FOREIGN AFF.
(1993).
8 Interview by Michael Steinberger with Samuel Huntington, Professor,
Harvard University, in So, Are Civilisations at War?, GUARDIAN, Oct. 11,
2001, available at http://observer.guardian.co.uk/islam/story/0,1442,577982,00.html, noting:
Clearly, Osama bin Laden wants [9/11] to be a clash of civilisations
between Islam and the West. The first priority for our government is
to try to prevent it from becoming one. But there is a danger it could
move in that direction. The administration has acted exactly the
right way in attempting to rally support among Muslim governments. But there are pressures here in the US to attack other terrorist groups and states that support terrorist groups. And that, it
seems to me, could broaden it into a clash of civilisations.
Huntington’s position has not changed measurably since 2001. See Interview
by Mark O’Keefe with Samuel Huntington, Professor, Harvard, Five Years
After 9/11, The Clash of Civilizations Revisited, The Pew Forum on Religion
&
Public
Life
(Aug.
18,
2006),
http://pewforum.org/events/index.php?EventID=125; Interview by Amina R. Chaudary with Samuel
Huntington, in The Clash of Civilizations Revisited, 24 NEW PERSPS. Q. (Aug.
27, 2007), available at http://www.digitalnpq.org/archive/2007_winter/14_huntington.html.
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ly condemned as such a failure that the case would not be cited
as authority by any subsequent international judicial body. 9
This paper explores why that incompatibility between Islam and international criminal law persists and considers recommendations for mitigating that dynamic. Why is this important? Primarily because the Western-influenced international
criminal law apparatus and the Muslim world are likely to collide more often in the future. If a war crimes tribunal is established in Afghanistan, or if the trial of Syrian agents for the assassination of Lebanon’s former prime minister goes forward, it
is imperative that Islamic societies touched by those processes
feel a sense of “buy-in” or participation that is meaningful for
them. Otherwise, it becomes the same old story of Western
domination over conflicting Muslim interests, and that story
only breeds more resentment and even hatred.
II. THE “STATE” PROBLEM
Although individuals are the subject of International Criminal Law, states are the actors that devise what the law is,
create the tribunals and hire the prosecutors to enforce it, and
jail those convicted of violating it. States are manifestations of
the people living in them; thus Islamic states are easily generalized as having an “Islamic” animus. Yet, Islamic states are also seen as not participating widely in International Criminal
Law. Why not? Before that question is answered, one must
appreciate the loaded nature of the term “Islamic state.”
What is an Islamic state? There are fifty seven state
10
members in the Organization of Islamic Conference (“OIC”).
Yet that cannot be the true measure of how an Islamic state is
defined because some OIC members do not even have majority
Islamic populations. Measured by the yardstick of religious
adherence of a population to Islam, there are in fact forty-seven
predominantly Islamic states plus Palestine. Table 1 correlates
11
OIC states with their respective Islamic populations.
9 Marlise Simons, Hussein's Case Won't Bolster International Human
Rights Law, Experts Fear, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2006, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/31/world/middleeast/31history.html?_r=1&o
ref=slogin.
10 See Organization of the Islamic Conference, http://www.oic-oci.org/
(last visited Apr. 2, 2010).
11 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK (2007), available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html.
The following statistics are missing from Table 1: Maldives: 100% of the Maldivian population is Sunni Muslim, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND
CRIME, UNGASS GOALS ON CONTROL OF PRECURSORS: SOUTH ASIA,
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/india/publications/ungass_Goals/19_annexureivcountryreport-maldives.pdf; Somalia: 99.5% of the Somalian population is
Muslim, Moshe Terdman, Muslims Persecution of Christians: The Unknown
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TABLE 1: MUSLIM POPULATIONS WITHIN OIC MEMBER STATES
OIC
STATES
Afghanistan
Albania

% POP.
MUSLIM
99%
70%

Azerbaijan

93.40%

Bahrain
Bangladesh
Benin

81.20%
83%
24.40%

Bosnia and
Herzegovina
Brunei

67%

Burkina Faso

50%

Cameroon
Chad

40%

20%
53.10%

Comoros
Cote d'Ivoire

98%
40%

Djibouti
Egypt

94%
90%

OTHER RELIGIONS
Other 1%
Albanian Orthodox 20%,
Roman Catholic 10%
Russian Orthodox 2.5%, Armenian
Orthodox 2.3%, other 1.8% (1995 est.)
Christian 9%, other 9.8% (2001 census)
Hindu 16%, other 1% (1998)
Christian 42.8%, Vodoun 17.3%, other
15.5% (2002 census)
Orthodox 31%, Roman Catholic 15%,
other 14%
Buddhist 13%, Christian 10%,
other (includes indigenous beliefs) 10%
Indigenous beliefs 40%, Christian
(mainly Roman Catholic) 10%
Indigenous beliefs 40%, Christian 40%
Catholic 20.1%, Protestant 14.2%, animist
7.3%, other 0.5%, unknown 1.7%,
atheist 3.1% (1993 census)
Roman Catholic 2%
Indigenous 25-40%, Christian 20-30%
(2001), migratory workers: Muslim (70%),
Christian (20%)
Christian 6%
Coptic 9%, other Christian 1%

Side of Radical Islam in Somalia, SOFIR, June 2006, http://www.sofir.org/sarchives/005657.php; Yemen: virtually all citizens, around 99%,
are Muslim, belonging either to the Zaydi order of Shi'a Islam (30%) or to the
Shafa'i order of Sunni Islam (70%). In Gaza, the population is comprised of
99.3% Muslim and 0.07% Christian citizens. Central Intelligent Agency, The
World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gz.html (last visited Apr. 27. 2010). West Bank population is comprised
of 75% Muslim, 17% Jewish and 8% Christian and other citizens. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/-library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/we.html (last visited Apr. 27, 2010).
With respect to religious affiliations (not actual population numbers): “Palestine is today perhaps the most homogeneous society in the Middle East in
matters of religion, being the only country with close to 100% of its population belonging to Sunni Islam. Things were different earlier, when Judaism,
Christianity and Druze religion were strong elements. Hardship over decades
through the 20th century, the division into two separate entities, alongside
great intolerance among Palestinian Muslims are the main factors leading to
the present uniformity. Palestinian Christians formed sizeable communities
up until recently, but their number is now less than 1%. Looklex Encyclopedia, Palestine, Religions, http://lexicorient.com/e.o/palestine_4.htm (last visited Apr. 27, 2010).
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Gabon
Gambia, The
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Guyana
Indonesia

1%
90%
85%
45%
10%
86.10%

Iran

98%

Iraq
Jordan
Kuwait

97%
92%
85%

Kyrgyzstan
Lebanon
Libya
Malaysia

75%
59.70%
97%
60.40%

Maldives
Mali
Mauritania
Morocco
Mozambique

100%
90%
100%
98.70%
17.80%

Niger

80%

Nigeria
Oman

50%
75%

Pakistan
Palestine
Qatar
Saudi Arabia
Senegal

97%
100%
77.50%
100%
94%

Sierra Leone
Somalia
Sudan

60%
99.50%
70%

Surinam

19.60%

Syria
Tajikistan
Togo
Tunisia
Turkey

90%
90%
20%
98%
99.80%

Christian 55%-75%, animist
Christian 9%, indigenous beliefs 1%
Christian 8%, indigenous beliefs 7%
Indigenous beliefs 50%, Christian 5%
Christian 50%, Hindu 35%, other 5%
Protestant 5.7%, Roman Catholic 3%,
Hindu 1.8%, other or unspecified 3.4%
(2000 census)
Other (includes Zoroastrian, Jewish,
Christian, and Baha'i) 2%
Christian or other 3%
Christian 6%, (2001 est.)
Other (includes Christian, Hindu, Parsi)
15%
Russian Orthodox 20%, other 5%
Christian 39%, other 1.3%
Other 3%
Buddhist 19.2%, Christian 9.1%, Hindu
6.3%, other traditional Chinese religions
2.6%, (2000 census)
N/A
Christian 1%, indigenous beliefs 9%
N/A
Christian 1.1%, Jewish 0.2%
Catholic 23.8%, Zionist Christian 17.5%,
other 17.8%, none 23.1% (1997 census)
Other (includes indigenous beliefs and
Christian) 20%
Christian 40%, indigenous beliefs 10%
Other (includes Sunni Muslim, Shi’a
Muslim, Hindu) 25%
Other (includes Christian and Hindu) 3%
Jewish settlers considered Israeli citizens
Christian 8.5%, other 14% (2004 census)
N/A
Christian 5% (mostly Roman Catholic),
indigenous beliefs 1%
Christian 10%, indigenous beliefs 30%
N/A
Christian 5% (mostly in south and
Khartoum), indigenous beliefs 25%
Hindu 27.4%, Protestant 25.2% (predominantly Moravian), Roman Catholic 22.8%,
indigenous beliefs 5%
Christian (various denominations) 10%,
Jewish
Other 10% (2003 est.)
Christian 29%, indigenous beliefs 51%
Christian 1%, Jewish and other 1%
Other 0.2% (mostly Christians and Jews)
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Eastern Orthodox 9%, unknown 2%
Roman Catholic 41.9%, Protestant 42%,
other 3.1%, none 0.9% (2002 census)
Other (includes Christian, Hindu) 4%
Eastern Orthodox 9%, other 3%
Small numbers of Jewish, Christian, and
Hindu

As Table 1 clearly demonstrates, the degree of Islamic
practice within predominantly Islamic states varies widely, not
to mention the type of Islam practiced. Nor is coverage of OIC
membership completely correlative with predominantly Muslim states: Algeria, which is not an OIC member, has a Muslim
12
population of 99%. While geographic dispersal loosely tracks
OIC membership combined with practicing population statistics per state (see map below), diversity among Islamic states is
widespread, creating a heterogeneous mosaic of states as opposed to a monolithic “civilization” as Huntington might ar13
gue.

-

.~-
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~.

.-"''!=.....~
Indone"a

Figure 2: Worldwide Muslim Distributions
(Source - CIA, 1995)

a.

Institutional Diversity

Key diversity factors revolve around geography, ethnicity
and cultural differentiation. Degree and type of tribalism also
come into play. Yet one might generalize that all Islamic societies tend to be more socially conservative. However, it is still

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK, Algeria (2007),
available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ag.html.
13 HUNTINGTON, supra note 6.
12
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axiomatic that conservative African values ≠ conservative
Arab values ≠ conservative Persian values ≠ conservative South
Asian values.
The societies in which Islam thrives today color the type of
Islam practiced within those states as assuredly as North
American, Latin American, European or African value systems
color the type of Catholicism practiced – which is not exactly as
Rome prescribes, much to the consternation of the Pope. Nevertheless, outcomes can sometimes be similar – as in the case
of treatment of women. Whether this is a function of the preIslamic tribal society or of Islam is a better question, and one
that should be left to a sociologist, not an international law
specialist.
Diversity within the Muslim world also comes by way of
political organization. Not all Islamic states are Islamic republics, monarchies, theocracies, or secular states. For instance,
15
Libya is a secular dictatorship, Morocco is a constitutional
16
17
monarchy, Brunei is a religious sultanate, Turkey is a secu18
19
lar republic and Saudi Arabia is a religious monarchy. The
political systems adopted vary widely in the Muslim world,
which directly impacts the character of criminal law domestically and therefore can affect the approach taken to interna20
tional criminal law.
This symbol connotes “does not equal.”
U.S. DEPT. ST. BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY HUM. RTS. AND LBR.,
INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT 2003: LIBYA (Dec. 18, 2003),
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2003/24457.htm
16 U.S. DEPT. ST. BUREAU OF NEAR EASTERN AFF., BACKGROUND NOTE:
MOROCCO (Oct. 2007), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5431.htm.
17 U.S. DEPT. ST. BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFF., BACKGROUND
NOTE: BRUNEI (May 2007), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2700.htm
18 U.S. DEPT. ST. BUREAU OF NEAR EASTERN AFF., BACKGROUND NOTE:
TURKEY (Sept. 2007), available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3432.htm.
19 U.S. DEPT. ST. BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY HUM. RTS. AND LBR.,
INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT 2005: SAUDI ARABIA (Nov. 4,
2005), http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2005/51609.htm.
20 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK (2007), available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html.
The choices that Islamic societies make vis-à-vis democratic regimes is also
impacted as in the case of Indonesia:
[A]n interesting observation about Indonesian politics that is instructive for the future course of politics throughout the Muslim
world. The apparent disappearance of socialism as a legitimate alternative for organizing politics and society has left two competing
alternatives in Indonesia. One alternative is a republic based in part
on Western notions of secular governance, and the other is an Islamic state rooted in traditional principles of governance. How society in
the world's largest Muslim country is able to reconcile these competing political philosophies may very well be one of the most important
political developments of the twenty-first century.
LAWRENCE S. GRAHAM ET AL., THE POLITICS OF GOVERNING: A COMPARATIVE
14
15
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Constitutional Role of Islam
21

Examples of Islamic Republics include Pakistan, Afgha22
23
24
nistan, Mauritania, and Iran – which has a very high de25
This is born
gree of religiosity mixed with state apparatus.
out in key provisions of Iran’s constitution, which glosses the
law with heavy religious overtones – including identifying God
as the supreme source of legislation:
Iranian Constitution:
Article 2 - The Islamic Republic is a system based on belief in:
1. The One God, His exclusive sovereignty and the right to legislate, and the necessity of submission to His commands;
2. Divine revelation and its fundamental role in setting forth
the laws;
3. The return to God in the Hereafter, and the constructive role
of this belief in the course of man's ascent towards God; [and]
4. The justice of God in creation and legislation.
Article 4 - All civil, penal, financial, economic, administrative,
cultural, military, political, and other laws and regulations must
be based on Islamic criteria. This principle applies absolutely and
generally to all articles of the Constitution as well as to all other
laws and regulations, and the fuqaha' of the Guardian Council

INTRODUCTION ch.8 (2007), available at http://www.cqpress.com/cs/graham/chap8/study.asp. For further discussion, see Khaled Abou El Fadl,
Islam and the Challenge of Democratic Commitment, 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 4
(2003); Anver M. Emon, On Democracy as a Shar'i Moral Presumption: Response to Khaled Abou El Fadl, 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 72 (2003).
21 U.S. DEPT. ST. BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY HUM. RTS. AND LBR.,
INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT 2005: PAKISTAN (Nov. 8, 2005),
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2005/51621.htm:
[Pakistan] is an Islamic republic, and the Constitution requires that laws
be consistent with Islam. The Constitution states that "subject to law, public
order and morality, every citizen shall have the right to profess, practice and
propagate his religion;" however, in practice the Government imposes limits
on freedom of religion. Islam is the state religion. Freedom of speech is constitutionally "subject to any reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the interest of the glory of Islam." The country was created to be a homeland for
Muslims, although its founders did not envisage it as an Islamic state.
22 U.S. DEPT. ST. BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY HUM. RTS. AND LBR.,
INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT 2005: AFGHANISTAN (Nov. 8,
2005), http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2005/51615.htm.
23 U.S. DEPT. ST. BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY HUM. RTS. AND LBR.,
INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT 2005: MAURITANIA (Nov. 8, 2005),
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2005/51484.htm.
24 U.S. DEPT. ST. BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY HUM. RTS. AND LBR.,
INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT 2005: IRAN (Nov. 8, 2005),
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2005/51599.htm.
25 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK, Iran (2007),
available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ir.html.
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are judges in this matter.

26

By comparison, the tone of similar provisions in Turkey’s
secular constitution, reveals the degree of political diversity
within the Muslim world – especially as it relates to the underlying character of the laws in those countries:
Turkish Constitution:
Article 2 - The Republic of Turkey is a democratic, secular and
social state governed by the rule of law; bearing in mind the concepts of public peace, national solidarity and justice; respecting
human rights; loyal to the nationalism of Atatürk, and based on
the fundamental tenets set forth in the Preamble.
Article 12 - Everyone possesses inherent fundamental rights
and freedoms which are inviolable and inalienable....
Article 13 - Fundamental rights and freedoms may be restricted
only by law and in conformity with the reasons mentioned in the
relevant articles of the Constitution without infringing upon
their essence. These restrictions shall not be in conflict with the
letter and spirit of the Constitution and the requirements of the
democratic order of the society and the secular Republic and the
27
principle of proportionality.

A sense of religious overtone to the law itself has significant consequences for how populations interact with the law
and the state. Iran, unlike Turkey, operates on the basis of Islamic law reigning supreme and clerics controlling the laws
28
that are promulgated and enforced.
III. LEGAL DIVERGENCE: COMPLETE INCOMPATIBILITY?
Indeed, what is Islamic law? The origins of Islamic law
date to the 7th Century founding of the religion. Shari‛a (root:
shara'a  )عرشis a term used to denote divinely inspired Islamic
law, which means “the way” as used in the Qur’an 45:18 –
“Then We put thee on the (right) Way of Religion: so follow
thou that (Way), and follow not the desires of those who know

26 Qanuni Assassi Jumhuri’i Isla’mai Iran [The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran] art. 4, 1358 (1980), available at http://www.iranonline.com/iran/iran-info/government/constitution-1.html. For the full text of
the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, see http://www.iranonline.com/iran/iran-info/government/constitution.html.
27 Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasası [The Constitution of the Republic of
Turkey] art. 13, 1982, available at http://www.anayasa.gov.tr/images/loaded/pdf_dosyalari/THE_CONSTITUTION_OF_THE_REPUBLIC_OF_TUR
KEY.pdf.
28 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, IRAN HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, 1995 (Mar. 1996),
http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/democracy/1995_hrp_report/95hrp_report_nea/I
ran.html
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Islamic legal scholars are well aware of the disdain that
Western legal scholars have traditionally held Shari‛a:
When looked at in Europe for over a century, “Islamic law” could
only disappoint, and in fact was made to disappoint. It could
never match any version of European law. It was ineffective, inefficient, even incompetent. It was thought mostly to apply to
personal status, having at an early stage ‘divorced’ itself from
‘state and society.’ Its penal law was a little more burlesque,
‘never had much importance,’ and was in fact downright ‘deficient.’ Of course, much of this was colonialist discourse and potent doctrine, cumulatively but programmatically designed to
desiccate the Shari‛a and replace it with Western codes and institutions. . . . These stereotypes remain tenacious. . . . 30

Consequently, there is a bit of defensiveness pushing back
from the Muslim legal world against Western presumptions
against their systems, to the extent that those systems exist intact or were resurrected after colonialism ended.
a.

Sources & Nature of Islamic Law
The sources of Shari‛a are:


The Qur’an, which is infallible;



The Sunnah – ancient traditional interpretive guides to
the Qur’an functioning as a living example of Muhammad;



The Fiqh – the body of Islamic jurisprudence including
the rulings of judges and Islamic scholars that direct and
apply Shari‛a to individual Muslims in their daily lives –
inclusive of:



The Qiyas – analogical reasoning of jurists;



The Ijma – consensus 31

As with any legal system, there is a divergence of Shari‛a
interpretation even within the predominantly Muslim states
that utilize it. Every Muslim agrees on the authority of the
Qur’an as it is the word of God. Sunni and Shi’a Muslims disagree about which aspects of the Sunnah to follow depending
upon which ancient scholar authored portions of the Sunnah:
Sunni Muslims tend to follow all of it, while Shi’a Muslims
29 For an electronic version of The Holy Qur'an, see THE HOLY QUR’AN
(M.H. Shakir trans., Tahrike Tarsile Qur’an Inc., 1983), available at
http://quod.lib.umich.edu/cgi/k/koran/koran-idx?type=DIV0&byte=783591.
30 Wael B. Hallaq, What is Shari‛a?, in 12 Y.B. OF ISLAMIC & MIDDLE E. L.
151-152 (2005-2006).
31 MATTHEW LIPPMAN, SEAN MCCONVILLE & MORDECHAI YERUSHALMI,
ISLAMIC CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 28-29 (1988).
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don’t follow that portion written by Umar, the second Sunni
32
Caliph.
Some Muslim scholars challenge the inclusion of the Fiqh
as it inappropriately blends revealed and unrevealed truth and
argue that the Qur’an and Sunnah should be kept separate as
a Basic Law from the Fiqh, which is a constantly evolving body
33
of law.
The Fiqh is not subject to codification; it is an evolving
34
body of jurisprudence as determined by Islamic scholars. But
the Fiqh is much less ascertainable than the evolving law in
common law Western jurisdictions. The Fiqh is subdivided into
schools of thought (4 Sunni and 1 Shi’ite), which further fracture it as follows:


Malikites (most conservative) – Northern African states



Hanafites (more emphasis on custom) – Afghanistan,
Turkey, Pakistan, Egypt



Shafi’ites (rationalists) – Indonesia, Eastern African
states



Hanbalites (Wahhabi traditionalists) – Saudi Arabia



Shi’ites (subdivides into 3 branches) – Imamiya is fol35
lowed in Iran

Despite the divergence of opinion on the bearing of Shari‛a,
its religious intonations persist no matter what interpretation
it is given. Such intonations are therefore included in the criminal aspects of Islamic Law. Western criminal law also originally shared religious intonations, but long ago abandoned
36
these for the secularized bearing of today.
The divergence of Shari‛a from Western law varies with
which aspects of Islamic law are at issue. The civil, especially
commercial (financial and contracts) aspects of Shari‛a largely
32 Christopher M. Blanchard, Congressional Research Services, Order
No. RS21745, Islam: Sunnis and Shiites (2009), available at http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS21745.pdf.
33 Ali Khan, The Reopening of the Islamic Code: The Second Era of Ijtihad, 1 ST. THOMAS L.J. 341 (2003).
34 Id.
35 RUDOLPH PETERS, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN ISLAMIC LAW 6 (2005);
LIPPMAN, supra note 31, at 28-33.
36 See, e.g., HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF
THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION (1983). This point is debatable and many
may believe that the West should rejoin religious morality with secular law.
Some may even believe that it never was abandoned and some in the Muslim
world may think that Western laws are still reflective of Judeo-Christian notions of right and wrong. Indeed, many in the Muslim world may in fact believe that while Western laws are Judeo-Christian, Western society is not living that way.
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37

comport with generalized Western law. The personal (family)
and criminal aspects of Shari‛a, however, diverge significantly
38
from generalized Western law.
Western law, especially the civil code iteration, has formed
the basis for international criminal law and the foundation for
international criminal tribunals, infusing international criminal process with Western predilections. Thus, the more a predominantly Islamic State has incorporated the criminal aspects
of Shari‛a, the less likely that state is to participate in international criminal law processes. Major criminal Islamic law
(Shari‛a) divides itself into two categories: major crimes
against Men – Homicide and Wounding, and crimes against
God – Theft, Banditry, Unlawful Sexual Intercourse, Unfounded Accusation of Unlawful Sexual Intercourse (slander),
39
Drinking Alcohol and Apostasy.
Crimes against God are those mentioned in the Qur’an and
have fixed punishments that may not be altered. These are
40
known as Hadd crimes, and examples of the punishments
mandated for such crimes include:


Theft – Amputation of one or both hands



Banditry – Crucifixion



Adultery – Death by stoning



Fornication – Flogging



Slander – Flogging



Public Intoxication – Flogging

41

Deterrence is the key goal for these infractions, thus the
42
harshness of the punishment. The Saudi’s have long claimed
that the low crime rate within the Kingdom compared to that
in other predominantly Muslim states that do not wholly incorporate Shari‛a is irrefutable proof that deterrence works in
their society – a claim that has gained some salience with even
43
western social scientists.
Moreover, Hadd punishments must be administered sequentially, so if a person is convicted of theft, slander, and
drinking alcohol, the punishments follow in sequence: amputa37 OUSSAMA ARABI, STUDIES IN MODERN ISLAMIC LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE
189-90 (2001).
38 Id.
39 PETERS, supra note 35, at 24. Minor crimes (tazir and qesas crimes)
are not considered here.
40 LIPPMAN, supra note 31, at 41.
41 PETERS, supra note 35, at 53.
42 Id. at 30.
43 Sam S. Souryal, The Religionization of a Society: The Continuing Application of Shariah Law in Saudi Arabia, 26(4) J. FOR SCI. STUD. REL. 429-49
(1987).
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Because Hadd pution, flogging and additional flogging.
nishments are harsh, the evidentiary standard is high. Only
confessions made in court are valid, witness testimony must
come from two Muslim men of good standing (or one Muslim
man and two Muslim women), and circumstantial evidence is
45
Since these are
not admitted if retaliation is demanded.
crimes against God, repentance, if proved, can exculpate one
being tried for a Hadd crime. “By showing his repentance, the
offender actually proves that he has already been reformed and
46
does not need to be punished anymore.”
That said, there remains interpretive flexibility, so judges
rarely inflict these punishments.
If a person cannot be sentenced to a fixed punishment for a hadd
offence because of lack of evidence, although it is otherwise
plausible that he is guilty of it, he may be sentenced to discretionary punishment. For such sentences the strict rules of evidence
do not apply. Circumstantial evidence is allowed, especially as47
sumptions based on a person’s reputation.

While crimes are circumscribed under Islamic law, elements of
crimes are often not codified. “There are very few general prin48
ciples in Islamic criminal law.”
Consequently, the criminal
justice system is ripe for abuse – especially if there are no real
democratic structural or political constraints on the government.
How homicide is treated under classic Shari‛a provides one
with a glimpse into this system. The objectives pursued for
homicide prosecution are a combination of retribution and retaliation. Retaliation is only allowed “if the victim’s bloodprice
49
is the same as or higher than the offender’s.” Financial compensation for murder is handled on the civil side of the ledger,
not the criminal side, in the U.S. – as was famously demonstrated in the California state trials of the American football
50
star O.J. Simpson in the 1990’s.
The prosecution is a decidedly victim-driven endeavor, as
opposed to criminal prosecution in Western societies where victims play no role other than possibly as witnesses to the
51
crime.
Under Islamic law, the victim’s surviving family
PETERS, supra note 35, at 32.
Id. at 15.
46 PETERS, supra note 35, at 27.
47 Id. at 16.
48 Id. at 19.
49 Id. at 47.
50 Symposium, American Bar Association Report on Perceptions of the
U.S. Justice System, 62 ALB. L. REV. 1307, 1313 (1999).
51 PETERS, supra note 35, at 146.
44
45
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serves as the prosecution in an adversarial process. Continuance of the prosecution is dependent upon the will of the victim’s family – they can withdraw at any time, and the killer
may be pardoned by the victim’s family.
If a defendant’s guilt is proven, the victim’s family may
demand retaliation or blood money. Financial compensation
varies with the victim’s sex, religion and legal status (the blood
price of a woman is half that of a man). Retaliation is allowed
if killing was intentional, otherwise the victim’s family is entitled to financial compensation. Retaliation involves inflicting
the same wounds on the perpetrator as the victim endured (eye
for an eye; life for a life logic prevails here). The victim’s family
also may carry out the execution of a death sentence under the
supervision of a state agent, but the potential executioner must
demonstrate sufficient skill with a sword. If the victim has no
next of kin, the state undertakes prosecution and punish52
ment.
Only confessions and eyewitness testimony are admissible
for homicide under Shari‛a; no circumstantial evidence is ad53
Mens Rea concepts are also in play: “[An] offender
mitted.
must have had the power to commit or not to commit the act
(qudra); must have known (‘ilm) that the act was an offense;
54
Thus, minors and
and must have acted with intent (qasd).”
the insane do not qualify as prosecutable perpetrators. Moreover, killing an attacker in defense of life, honor or property of
oneself or one’s relatives is lawful if the act is proportional to
55
the acts of the attacker.
The question of the intent of the murderer is more objectified under Islamic law, which, like Western common law, affords degrees of homicide. However, intent is ascertainable
from the crime scene itself:
In Islamic law, intent is discerned from the manner in which a
crime is committed, in particular the type of weapon used. The
assumption is that an individual intending to kill will use a weapon with lethal capabilities. Relying on this type of visible, objective evidence avoids the necessity of determining what was in the
mind of the offender at the time. 56

b.

Usage of Shari‛a

The level of criminal Shari‛a utilized within a predominantly Islamic State varies by state. For example, Pakistan
Id. at 31.
Id. at 12-15.
54 Id. at 20.
55 Id. at 25.
56 LIPPMAN, supra note 31, at 50.
52
53
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employs it very selectively and under a westernized respect for
rule of law, while Saudi Arabia uses it exclusively, employing a
57
5000 member religious police force to enforce it.
Many states with predominantly Muslim populations incorporate some degree of Shari‛a in commercial or family mat58
59
ters; fewer use it for criminal law. Since 1972, seven states
have adopted pre-Colonial criminal aspects of Islamic Law:
Libya, Pakistan, Iran, Sudan, the Northern States of Nigeria,
Egypt and Saudi Arabia, where Shari‛a was never extin60
In Egypt, the Supreme Court endeavors to balance
guished.
the mandate of Article 2 in the constitution, requiring all legislation to conform to Shari‛a, with life in the modern world
61
through creative judicial interpretation against the backdrop
62
of an overall reconstruction of Islamic law.
Iran is an active death penalty state, employing hanging
on a regular basis, and since the 1979 revolution, it has reinstituted amputation as a punishment for criminal conduct in
accordance with Islamic law. However, Iranian judges have recently begun the practice of double amputations – ordering the
right hand and right foot cut off so that walking for the survivor is nearly impossible even with a crutch or cane. According
to the judicial branch in Sistan-Baluchistan Province, which is
undertaking these more extreme measures, deterrence is the
stated goal for this policy. 63
The strictest aspects of Shari‛a were, of course, in play under the Taliban government in Afghanistan, which was overth64
65
rown in 2001. Parts of Malaysia and the United Arab EmiPETERS, supra note 35, at 148-53.
ARABI, supra note 37.
59 Id.
60 PETERS, supra note 35, at 148-53.
61 Clark B. Lombardi & Nathan J. Brown, Do Constitutions Requiring
Adherence to Shari'a Threaten Human Rights? How Egypt's Constitutional
Court Reconciles Islamic Law with the Liberal Rule of Law, 21 AM. U. INT'L L.
REV. 379 (2006).
62 ARABI, supra note 37, at 191-93.
63 Nazila Fathi, Hanging and Amputation Find Favor in Iran Courts,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2008, at A3.
64 Hannibal Travis, Freedom or Theocracy?: Constitutionalism in Afghanistan and Iraq, 3 NW. U. J. INT'L HUM. RTS. 4, 56 (2005). “The Taliban aimed
to install a government and legal system that would revive a life like pious
Muslims had lived ‘1,400 years ago.’ The Attorney General of the Taliban declared: ‘The Constitution is the Shari’a so we don't need a constitution.’”
65 Islamic Plan Unveiled for Malaysia, BBC NEWS, Nov. 12, 2003,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3263785.stm; David Camroux, State
Responses to Islamic Resurgence in Malaysia, 36 ASIAN SURV. 852, 860 (Sept.
1996); Malaysia's top court draws line after Islamic cases, REUTERS, July 26,
2007, available at http://in.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idINIndia-28665220070726:
57
58
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66

rates are moving towards incorporating Shari‛a, with varying
prospects for success. What is the attraction to re-introducing
the criminal aspects of Shari‛a within a predominantly Muslim
state? As Professor Rudolph Peters of Amsterdam University
notes, it has multiple attractions for multiple constituencies:
Muslims, in order to be good Muslims, must live in an Islamic
state, a state which implements Shari‛a. It is not sufficient that
that such a state gives Muslims the choice to follow or not to follow the Shari‛a, it must actually impose the Shari‛a on them, by
implementing Islamic criminal law . . . . The establishment of an
Islamic state is presented as a religious duty for all Muslims and
as an endeavor that may bring Paradise within their reach. And
there is another felicitous prospect connected with it: that of a
pious and virtuous community on earth that enjoys God’s favour
and is actively aided by Him to overcome poverty and humiliation. . . . The reintroduction of Islamic criminal law is, from this
perspective, a step towards salvation in the Hereafter as well as
in this life. It is, therefore, much more than a merely technical
reform of penal law. The notions connected with it make the
project of enforcing Islamic criminal law attractive to both the
ruling elite and large parts of the Muslim population. 67

Although some aspects of Shari‛a may be in play for an Islamic state, that is not to say that the population or government would support a complete imposition of Islamic law for all
Malaysia's highest court has ruled that legal cases involving nonMuslims cannot be decided by Shari’a courts, drawing a line after a
spate of high-profile cases that left many in legal limbo. The Federal
court, in a landmark judgment, held that disputes between a Muslim
and a non-Muslim on family and Islamic matters should be settled in a
civil court.
66 According to Dubai’s court system, civil and criminal courts generally
retain jurisdiction appealable up to a court of cassation, but Shari’a courts
have some influence:
Sharia or Islamic courts work alongside the civil and criminal courts in
the UAE. The Sharia court is the Islamic court in the UAE and is primarily responsible for civil matters between Muslims. Non-Muslims
will not appear before a Sharia court in any matter. Sharia courts have
the exclusive jurisdiction to hear family disputes, including matters involving divorce, inheritances, child custody, child abuse and guardianship of minors. In the absence of any particular provision in the UAE
codified law, the Islamic principles of Sharia as found in the Islamic
Sharia textbooks are applied.
The Sharia court may, at the federal level only (which, as mentioned
earlier, excludes Dubai and Ras Al Khaimah), also hear appeals of certain criminal cases including rape, robbery, driving under the influence
of alcohol and related crimes, which were originally tried in lower criminal courts.
Consulate General of the United States, Dubai: The UAE Court System, Dubai-UAE (Mar. 25, 2005), available at http://dubai.usconsulate.gov/dubai/the_uae_court_system.html.
67 PETERS, supra note 35, at 144.

20 PACE INT’L L. REV. ONLINE COMPANION [Vol.
1:8
aspects of the law. The recent Red Mosque uprising in Islamabad centered on the Pakistani government’s resistance to the
imposition of the restrictive Taliban version of Shari‛a concern68
ing family law advocated by Islamists in Pakistan.
Furthermore, the level of Shari‛a usage may not be uniform even within a state. The Islamic parts of a state that are
overwhelmingly Muslim may develop Islamic criminal law systems within the framework of the larger state. Nigeria is a re69
States within Nigeria, like those within the
cent example.
U.S., have the power to enact their own criminal law.
Between January 2000 and April 2002, twelve northern
Nigerian states introduced the criminal aspects of Shari‛a, set
up Shari‛a courts and adopted Shari‛a penal codes conforming
to the Malikite school. Thus, Nigeria now has dual criminal
justice systems that nevertheless feed ultimately into a Supreme Court, albeit after passing through dual appellate
70
processes en route.

Figure 2: Northern States of Nigeria (BBC News)

The question then arises, if secular and Shari‛a criminal
justice systems can coexist within a federal polity, can Islamic
criminal law coexist with international criminal law in a similar fashion? Such a duality is already arguably in play with respect to human rights, as noted below in section IV. Whether
this offers a viable model is problematic.
68 David Bercuson, The Birth of Pakistan’s Taliban, GLOBE & MAIL (Canada), Dec. 31, 2007, at A15. See also PETERS, supra note 35, at 155-60; Shaheen Sardar Ali, “Sigh of the Oppressed”? “Islamisation” of the Laws of Pakistan under Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal: The Case of the North West Frontier
Province, in 10 Y.B. OF ISLAMIC & MIDDLE E. L. (2003-2004).
69 Mansur Noibi, Shari‛a and the Nigerian Constitution – The Jurisdiction of the Shari‛a Court of Appeal 97-108, in 10 Y.B OF ISLAMIC & MIDDLE E.
L. (2003-2004).
70 PETERS, supra note 35, at 169-73.
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Divergence of the Legal Culture

Justice is swift in Muslim societies – particularly in those
71
that practice Shari‛a. Criminal justice systems in the Muslim
world tend to operate on shorter time horizons than they do in
the West. This is especially true in Arab societies, where the
cultural paradigm reflects a preference for quick rewards and
punishments. Such tension played out dramatically during the
trial of Saddam Hussein in Baghdad, culminating in his hastily
72
organized execution on December 30, 2006.
Another case in point is Saudi Arabia. Criminal trials in
Saudi Arabia are conducted rapidly, many turning on coerced
confessions resulting from beatings and torture while in con73
Punishment ensues shortly thereafter. This is in
finement.
line with the traditional view of an Islamic judge’s role. “’Razing injustice’ was the [judge’s] unqualified duty, to be fulfilled
effectively and without undue delay. Protracted adjudication
and postponements in the judicial process were thus abhorred,
74
and deemed to aggravate injustice.”
Indeed, upon reinstituting strict Shari’a in post-Shah Iran, Ayatollah Khomeini said:
Islamic justice is based on simplicity and ease. It settles all criminal and civil complaints and in the most convenient, elementary,
and expeditious way possible. All that is required is for an Islamic judge, with pen and inkwell and two or three enforcers, to go
into a town, come to his verdict in any kind of case, and have it
75
immediately carried out.

In contrast, criminal trials in Western states are more protracted in both common law and civil law societies. Such trials
are often followed by extensive appeals opportunities, especially when the sentence is death. Modern international criminal
tribunals follow the Western model in this regard, and trials
76
can stretch into years, as was the case with the trail of Slobodan Milosevic before the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia in The Hague. The year-long trial of
Saddam Hussein before the Iraqi High Tribunal in Baghdad
was certainly an anomaly in this regard. Consequently, there
Id. at 146.
Michael J. Kelly, The Anfal Trial Against Saddam Hussein, 9 J.
GENOCIDE RES. 235 (2007).
73 U.S. DEPT. ST. BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY HUM. RTS. AND LBR., COUNTRY
REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES 2007: SAUDI ARABIA (Mar. 11, 2008),
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2007/100605.htm.
74 WAEL B. HALLAQ, SHARI’A: THEORY, PRACTICE, TRANSFORMATIONS 342343 (2009).
75 PETERS, supra note 35, at 147.
76 See generally WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE UN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNALS: THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, RWANDA, AND SIERRA LEONE (2006).
71
72
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is a wide divergence in time horizons for criminal process in Islamic societies versus that in western-modeled international
criminal tribunals.
IV. ISLAM & INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
At least in its procedural aspects, it is said that “international procedural criminal law originates from and draws considerably on human rights law. . . . The notion of human rights
underpinning the legitimacy of international criminal procedures was clearly envisaged by the 1946 judgment of the Nu77
Thus, the natural connection beremberg Tribunal . . . .”
tween human rights and international criminal law cannot be
ignored. It is instructive to review the efforts taken by many
states in the Islamic world to set themselves apart from the international human rights regime that has developed since the
end of the Second World War.
Many Islamic states that incorporate Shari‛a belong to
treaties outlawing international crimes as well as human
rights conventions. For instance, Saudi Arabia is a member of
78
the Convention on the
the Convention Against Torture,
79
Rights of the Child, and the Convention on the Elimination of
80
all forms of Discrimination Against Women and is also a
81
However, Saudi intermember of the Genocide Convention.
pretation of rights contained therein is rather restrictive. No
one would reasonably argue that the rights guaranteed to
women in the anti-discrimination treaty are observed in
Riyadh on the same basis as they are in Oslo, yet both Saudi
Arabia and Norway are parties to the same convention. This is
true of torture as well.
Yet, beyond interpretation, there is also a fundamental
disagreement concerning the very package of rights guaranteed. From the Islamic perspective, Islamic human rights are
actually more universal than those prescribed by U.N. conven82
tions because it extends to all individual’s belief in God. The
fallacy of such an argument is revealed in the collision of “indi77
GEERT-JAN ALEXANDER KNOOPS, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
INTERNATIONAL AND INTERNATIONALIZED CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 15-16 (2005).
78 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
79 Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3.
80 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13.
81 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
82 MASHOOD A. BADERIN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND ISLAMIC LAW
45-50 (2003).
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vidual liberty” with God’s will – which, in Islam, is always superior to the will of man. Islam, moreover, stresses the duties
of believers while international human rights law stresses the
rights of man.
For example, adultery is one of the gravest crimes in Islam
but is not considered a serious crime under international law.
Even Muslim defenders of an Islamic version of human rights
admit this incongruency:
The most significant difference between modern westernized attitudes towards human rights and their implementation and an Islamic perspective is the function of religion in general and the
position of God in particular. Whereas God hardly finds his place
anymore in Western lay societies, he is the seat of justice in the
Muslim world. Islam sees God as the ultimate source of justice,
which includes the Human Rights. The main goal of God's message to human kind is the attainment of Justice. At this point
there is a strong connection between Justice and Islam. 83

Thus, the Islamic view of human rights, especially in Shari‛a states, diverges from the Western view and therefore from
the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (“UDHR”) – which
Iran called a secular interpretation of the Judeo-Christian tra84
dition which could not be followed by Muslims in good faith.
This divergence led to the 1981 Universal Islamic Declaration
85
of Human Rights and later the 1990 adoption by the OIC of
86
the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam.
The Cairo Declaration was a direct Islamic response to the
UDHR, and Shari‛a pervades the document. In fact, Shari‛a is
the basis for the Cairo Declaration, which can only be interpreted to conform with Shari‛a. The Cairo Declaration departs
substantively from the UDHR in key aspects: It qualifies
87
rights of equality for women and individual freedoms such as
88
speech, it leaves open the possibility of discrimination in

Mohamed Al Awabdeh, History and Prospect of Islamic Criminal Law
with Respect to the Human Rights 10:2, (Dissertation, Humboldt University –
Berlin, 2005), available at http://edoc.hu-berlin.de/dissertationen/al-awabdehmohamed-2005-07-07/HTML/front.html.
84 BADERIN, supra note 82, at 26-29.
85 For the full text of the 1981 Universal Islamic Declaration of Human
Rights, see http://www.alhewar.com/ISLAMDECL.html.
86 For the full text of the 1990 Cairo Declaration of Human Rights in Islam, see http://www.religlaw.org/interdocs/docs/cairohrislam1990.htm.
87 Cairo Declaration, Article 6(a): “Woman is equal to man in human dignity, and has rights to enjoy as well as duties to perform; she has her own civil entity and financial independence, and the right to retain her name and
lineage.”
88 Cairo Declaration, Article 22(a): “Everyone shall have the right to express his opinion freely in such manner as would not be contrary to the principles of the Shari’a.”
83
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marriage on the basis of religion, and it allows for corporal
90
punishment – thereby undermining the human dignity keystone of human rights law.
The Western consensus on this Shari‛a-based alternative
to human rights is that, in principle, the Muslim world should
not be allowed to create a valid exception to international human rights norms. To do so denies the common humanity
shared by all people, and universally recognized minimum
standards of treatment are, of course, the main object and pur91
pose of the modern system of globalized human rights.
V.

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW

The internationalization of criminal law, which began in
earnest with the trial of Nazi leaders at Nuremberg in 1946,
has gained traction since the end of the Cold War. A proliferation of international institutions has given rise to a variety of
structural models available for the prosecution and adjudication of violations of international criminal law. Yet very few
Islamic jurists or Islamic states participate in the institutions
that support the development of this jurisprudence.
a.

Institutional Diversity

Two ad hoc tribunals, created by the U.N. Security Council
to address war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide
in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda, were designed to be
temporary in nature with narrowly prescribed territorial, subject-matter and temporal jurisdiction. They were, and still are,
staffed by international legal specialists not drawn from the
countries in which the atrocities took place, and are physically
removed from the those states as well.
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, located in The Hague, and the International Criminal
89 Cairo Declaration, Article 5(a): “The family is the foundation of society,
and marriage is the basis of its formation. Men and women have the right to
marriage, and no restrictions stemming from race, colour or nationality shall
prevent them from enjoying this right.”
90 Cairo Declaration, Article 20: “It is not permitted without legitimate
reason to arrest an individual, or restrict his freedom, to exile or to punish
him. It is not permitted to subject him to physical or psychological torture or
to any form of humiliation, cruelty or indignity. Nor is it permitted to subject
an individual to medical or scientific experimentation without his consent or
at the risk of his health or of his life. Nor is it permitted to promulgate emergency laws that would provide executive authority for such actions.”
91 Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Universal Versus Islamic Human Rights:
A
Clash of Cultures or a Clash with a Construct?, 15 MICH. J. INT’L L. 307
(1994).
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Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”), located in Arusha Tanzania,
both began operations in 1993. Each court is considered successful in that each added vital justice elements to the conflicts
they are associated with, achieved a relatively high degree of
interaction among the legal academy, and continue to produce
complex legal opinions that further elucidate difficult elements
of international criminal law. Nevertheless, the international
community quickly came to recognized that a chief weakness to
the ad hoc systems centered on a lack of involvement (and investment) by the local community. In short, the ad hoc tribunals were over-internationalized.
An attempt to remedy this central weakness was the creation of a hybridized model. Following conclusion of the civil
war in Sierra Leone, the U.N. worked with the local government to create a tribunal that contained both local and international judges, prosecutors, and staff, and was physically located
in the country where the crimes occurred. U.N. officials sought
to create a similar model for Cambodia, as the government began to pursue surviving former members of the Khmer Rouge
that participated in the 1975 genocide. That effort has not
been as successful as the Sierra Leone effort due, in large part,
to political issues on the Cambodian side of the equation. 92
In addition to the ad hoc and hybrid models, both meant to
be temporary in nature, a permanent model has emerged with
the creation of the International Criminal Court in 2002. Located in The Hague and staffed with international experts, the
theory behind the ICC is that a venue will be available when
local courts cannot or will not prosecute atrocities within their
jurisdictions. Moreover, it is meant to be shielded from the potential for politicization and serve as a larger deterrent to despotic conduct than previous institutions. Perhaps tellingly, all
of the ICC’s prosecutorial activity to date has concerned situa93
tions in Africa.
A final model may lie in the Lockerbie trial example –
which could be considered the ultimate form of ad hoc-ism.
This was a special court that resulted from a political settlement between the United States, the United Kingdom and
Libya to try two Muslim Libyan intelligence agents for the
bombing of Pan Am flight 103 on Dec. 21, 1988 over Lockerbie,
Scotland. The trial was held in The Hague at Camp Zeist but
94
Ali
tried under Scottish law and before Scottish judges.
92 Susan Postalwaite, The Pre-Trial Hearing of Pol Pot’s Key Woman
Commander is the Latest Attempt to Bring the Khmer Rouge’s Ageing Leaders
to Justice, S. CHINA MORNING POST, May 29, 2008, at 16.
93 See ARCHBOLD: INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURTS PRACTICE, PROCEDURE
AND EVIDENCE §§ 2-61, 3-1, 4-46 (2d ed. 2005).
94 Iain Scobbie, So Much Scots Law: The Legal Framework for the Lock-
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Mohmed Al Megrahi was found guilty and sentenced to life im95
prisonment while Al Amin Khalifa Fahima was acquitted.
Few nationals from Islamic States participate in international tribunals, and the ones who do are from the secularized
traditions: ICTY & ICTR each have one judge from Turkey and
Pakistan. The hybrid tribunals for Sierra Leone & Cambodian
Special Courts have none and the International Criminal Court
has none.
b.

Muslim Participation

International criminal law has come to focus mainly on only three types of atrocity: genocide, war crimes, and crimes
against humanity. A fourth crime, aggression, was tried at
Nuremberg and Tokyo, but has not been tried since. It is an
inchoate, undefined crime within the Rome Statute for the
ICC. 96 Islamic States have largely signed onto treaties outlawing these crimes. Yet Islamic states have not participated
meaningfully in the institutions that investigate and prosecute
them.
Nevertheless, Islamic societies have had (or will have)
some level of interaction with these three crimes in the context
of these international and domestic tribunals:


Bosnia-Herzegovina’s War Crimes Chamber in Sarajevo (taking ICTY overload and locally initiated cases): International and Bosnian judges trying mostly Serbs



Kosovo’s War Crimes Chamber: Muslim, Serb and International judges triumvirate trying mostly Serbs



Iraqi High Tribunal’s Prosecution of atrocities committed under Saddam: Muslims trying Muslims



East Timor’s Hybrid Tribunal: Mostly Catholics trying
Catholics (Muslims being tried in Jakarta by fellow Muslims)



ICC’s Investigation of genocide in Darfur, Sudan: NonMuslims trying Muslims

The Iraqi High Tribunal (“IHT”) is the only Arab nexus of
these five tribunals, three of which are domestic courts, one is
an analogue to a hybrid court, and one is a full-blown international tribunal. All of these tribunals, including the three doerbie Trial, 7 Y.B OF ISLAMIC & MIDDLE E. L. 157 (2000-01).
95 § 2-96 Lockerbie Precedent, in ARCHBOLD INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURTS (2d ed. 2005).
See also ILIAS BANTEKAS AND SUSAN NASH,
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW § 15-6 (2d ed., 2003).
96 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.183/9 (July 17, 1998).
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mestic courts, were designed by Westerners with American and
international expertise, not by Islamic legal scholars; all tribunals are code-based. Except for the IHT, all of the tribunals
experience chronic issues with asserting jurisdiction over defendants, collecting evidence, and administrative concerns with
respect to staffing and expertise. The U.S.-led occupation of
Iraq allowed the Regime Crimes Liaison Office (a division of
the U.S. Department of Justice that is located in Baghdad) to
97
render much of these support elements to the IHT.
There will also be interaction among Muslims and the
world of international criminal law in the context of the trial
that will unfold regarding the assassination of former Lebanese
Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister
was created by the United Nations Security Council under
98
Chapter VII on June 10, 2007 without approval from the Le99
The two Islamic states on the Security
banese Parliament.
100
Syria, Hezbollah,
Council (Qatar & Indonesia) abstained.
and Lebanon’s President oppose Tribunal. The Tribunal will
exist outside Lebanon in The Hague and will be staffed by international personnel, including an international prosecutor
assisted by a Lebanese deputy and a blend of International and
101
Lebanese judges.
The U.N. Commission conducting the investigation was led
by Belgian prosecutor Serge Brammertz, the ICC’s deputy
prosecutor, who submitted his final report in November
102
2007.
This will be the first International Tribunal to depart
Estelle R. Higonnet, Restructuring Hybrid Courts: Local Empowerment and National Criminal Defense Reform, 23 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. LAW
347, 430 (2006).
98 S.C. Res. 1644, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1644 (Dec. 15, 2005); S.C. Res. 1664,
U.N. Doc. S/Res/1664 (Mar. 29, 2006); S.C. Res.1757, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1757
(May 30, 2007).
99 Syria Will Note Cooperate with UN Hariri Tribunal, VOA NEWS.COM,
June 1, 2007, available at http://www1.voanews.com/english/news/a-13-200706-01-voa47.html.
100 Minutes of the 5685th Meeting of the Security Council, May 30, 2007,
S/PV.5685, available at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/PRO/N07/362/08/PDF/N0736208.pdf?OpenElement.
101 Press Conference by United Nations Legal Counsel on Special Tribunal for Lebanon, available at http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2007/070919_Michel.doc.htm. The Statute of the Tribunal is annexed to the Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Tribunal for
Lebanon, Nov. 15, 2006, S/2006/893, available at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/617/97/PDF/N0661797.pdf?OpenElement.
102 Ninth Report of the International Independent Investigation Commission, Nov. 2007, available at http://www.nowlebanon.com/Library/Files/EnglishDocumentation/Hariri%20Investigation/9th%20Brammertz%20report.pdf.
Mr. Brammertz left to fill the job of Chief Prosecutor at the ICTY upon the
departure of Carla del Ponte. His replacement is the Canadian Deputy Attorney General, Daniel Bellemare. Press Release, Secretary-General of the
97
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from focusing on the three traditional international crimes,
103
concentrating instead on terrorism and murder charges.
The defendants will likely be Syrian and Lebanese Muslims,
yet there will be little Islamic influence in the process.
Despite a lack of participation on the institutional side of
the equation, Islamic states have sometimes participated meaningfully in the development of international criminal law as it
is to be applied if they determine that their interests may be at
stake. For example, many Arab states participated in negotiations leading to the creation of the ICC, including the final negotiations of the Rome Statute in 1996-1998. Most sought to
exclude the designation of forced pregnancy as a crime against
humanity and restrict the definition of sexual violence to rape
only; a non-interference clause was finally inserted to protect
104
national customs with regard to pregnancy.
These states also pushed for the crime of aggression to be
state-centered only to allow for the co-existence of criminalized
individual aggression and the duty on the individual to Jihad
(the first meaning is personal struggle, but the secondary
meaning is military struggle against Western hegemony – es105
the crime of aggression was left
pecially in the Arab world);
undefined in the Rome Statute.
Very few Islamic States signed on to the Rome Statute. Of
the 104 states parties to the Rome Statute, twenty are OIC
members (and these are African states). Fifteen of these have
predominantly Muslim populations. Jordan is the only Arab
state party. None of the Shari‛a-centered Islamic States are
parties to the Rome Statute. Nigeria, which is not wholly Shari‛a, is the only state party with a partial Shari‛a system.

at
United
Nations,
SG/A/1109
(Nov.
16,
2007),
available
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/sga1109.doc.htm.
103 Kim Gattas, Lebanon’s Groundbreaking Tribunal, BBC NEWS, April
21, 2006, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4926536.stm.
“The international court will be the first to try a crime described as ‘terrorist’
by the U.N. While other special tribunals have dealt with war crimes and
crimes against humanity, like in Sierra Leone or Cambodia, it will be the
first time that international justice tackles a political crime that targeted a
specific person.” Id.
104 Steven C. Roach, Arab States and the Role of Islam in the International Criminal Court, 53 POL. STUD. 143 (2005), available at http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2005.00521.x.
105
Id. For a complete description of the proceedings, see 3 M. CHERIF
BASSIOUNI, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT:
SUMMARY RECORDS OF THE 1998 DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE (2005).
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VI. ACCOMMODATION FOR MUSLIM INTERESTS
Why are Shari‛a-centered Islamic States less likely to participate in international criminal law than Western States or
even secular Islamic states like Turkey? Several factors may
help explain this disconnect, including:


Islamic Law – if the legal system is derived from religious authority rather than secular, participation is less
likely



Level and type of Shari‛a practiced – if only the
commercial or non-divergent aspects of Islamic Law are
in play, participation is more likely; it becomes less likely
if the criminal or more divergent aspects are in play



Cultural drawbacks – The shape and extent of tribalism in the society that may disdain outside interference together with broad-based cultural expectations
like speed in trial and sentencing and victim participation are factors that could come into play



Rule of Law factors:


Independent judiciary (non-existent in most
Arab states)



Crimes in Shari‛a jurisdictions are not defined
– this can lead to abuse



Fractured nature of Shari‛a and the various
schools of Islamic Law



Level of Tailoring in Tribunal design to accommodate Islamic traditions – no war crimes tribunal to
date, international or domestic but Western-designed,
has been able to adequately accommodate Islamic interests



Level of antagonism by/with West – international
criminal law is a Western-driven process; the adoption of
Shari‛a itself in some states was a direct rejection of
Western criminal codes incorporated during the colonial
era that supplanted Shari‛a; political antagonism will
hobble efforts at greater participation

Some have proposed the development of a hybrid international/Islamic criminal court. However, the diversity of predominantly Islamic states, cultures and traditions within predominantly Islamic states, degree of incorporation of Islamic law,
adherence to varying schools of Islamic law and disagreement
over the content of criminal law mitigates against creating a
sustainable centralized international criminal tribunal in the
Muslim world. Nevertheless, the Muslim world is about where
the Western world was sixty years ago on international criminal law – agreeing on the broad outlines of the crimes but dif-
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fering on the particulars. Such obstacles were eventually overcome in the West, beginning with Nuremberg.
Once, and if, internal differences concerning criminal law
are surmounted within the Muslim world, differences between
the Islamic and Western view must be addressed. This, of
course, will be a very long process. Eventually, creation of a
hybrid international / Islamic criminal tribunal could be a first
step in addressing the disconnect between Shari‛a-centered Islamic states international criminal law and human rights.
But, again, that does not appear to be on the horizon.
A different view is offered by Professor Mashood Baderin,
University of London, who proposes reconstituting the Wilâyah
al- Mazâlim, a grievance tribunal from the early days of the Islamic Empire. This ancient court was endowed with broad jurisdiction to address violations of individual rights by state of106
Baderin seeks to use this type of body to help bridge
ficials.
wide gaps between the Cairo Declaration and international
107
human rights law.
For instance, the ICCPR provides guarantees against torture, forced labor, servitude, social/legal
equality, personal liberties, and freedom of thought, whereas
many Islamic societies do not.
As envisioned by Baderin, the reconstituted Mazâlim
Court “would be composed of . . . Islamic jurists learned in Islamic jurisprudence, but also . . . international human rights
108
law.”
The Court would have compulsory jurisdiction across
Islamic states, accommodate the views of all Islamic schools,
and develop a jurisprudence that moves toward a common in109
While this noterpretation of Islamic law for human rights.
tion is attractive, the lack of unity in the post-Caliphate world
among Islamic states renders its viability a weak prospect.
VII. CONCLUSION
Participation from Islamic states in the creation of international criminal law, and their support of international criminal
law institutions, is spotty at best. The more a predominantly
Islamic state adheres to a Shari‛a system, the less likely there
is to be participation of any kind. To the extent this happens,
as was the case with ICC negotiations, it is to blunt the incursion of international criminal law into the Islamic world, not to
further the work of the field. Yet, as in the case of new judicial
efforts in the Sudan, Bosnia, Indonesia, Kosovo and the forthBADERIN, supra note 82, at 229-30.
Id.
108 Id.
109 Id.
106
107
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coming Hariri tribunal, Muslims will increasingly be drawn into working with these institutions.
Western justice meted out by western judges using western law against Muslim defendants, as was the case in the
Lockerbie trial, is not a model that the Islamic world seeks to
follow. This outcome is more likely considering Islam’s passive
role in the process of creating, shaping, and participating in international criminal law– especially if terrorism crimes become
part of the chargeable canon as in the Hariri Tribunal.
How can greater meaningful participation from the Islamic
world be achieved? A number of outstanding questions remain.
Does creation of a separate legal system for Islamic versions of
human rights and international criminal law undermine the
“universality” of those immutable concepts? What place does
cultural relativism have in this discourse? If secular and Rule
of Law-centered Islamic States like Turkey and Pakistan can
participate in international criminal law, can the incompatibility between Shari‛a-centered Islam and international criminal
law be bridged in any way other than by adopting a dualistic
approach? How can the legitimacy of international criminal
law and the tribunals that implement it be maximized for Islamic societies? Is legitimacy a separate question from compatibility?
Finally, can the Maslah (public interest) component of Islamic law be creatively invoked to get around the Shari‛a obstacle? Islamic law defers greatly to public interest as an overriding consideration for modernists to argue that the
traditional hard-line Islamic approaches to crime can only be
imposed if they are in the public interest. Once this premise is
accepted, then those seeking to bring Islamic law into the modern world, thereby connecting it better with international law,
can progressively re-define “public interest.” That might be a
generational answer to this intractable problem, but it might
also be the best answer thus far.

